ASIAN REGIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND THE POSSIBILITIES FOR SOCIALIZING THE BEHAVIOR OF STATES

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This essay examines the "socializing effect" of Asian regional institutions, using the theoretical and conceptual prism of constructivist approaches to international relations. It is divided into three parts. The first briefly outlines the main and distinctive arguments of constructivism as a theory (or at least a perspective) on the study of international relations. Since socialization as a concept is deeply embedded in the theoretical literature of constructivism, it is useful to begin the essay by looking at the core assumptions and arguments of constructivism. Such an exercise also helps us to explore the role of institutions in constructivism, since international (including regional) institutions act as promoters and sites of socialisation. The second section highlights the insights generated by constructivist scholarship on Asian regional institutions. The third section considers the contribution of Asian regional institutions to socialisation, one of the most important conceptual tools of constructivism (Johnston 2008:xvi). This section addresses the specific question whether regional institutions in Asia have opened the possibility of socialising the behaviour of states, and to what extent the motivations and conditions of socialization as specified by constructivist theory have played out in the region and shaped its regional institutions.

At the outset, let me note some limitations of this essay. I write this assessment of constructivist scholarship on Asian institutions from 'within the camp', so to speak, hence subject to the presumptions and biases that come with this predicament. Second, my coverage of constructivist contributions to the study of Asian regionalism is not exhaustive. Although relatively new, the body of writings on Asian regionalism that is explicitly or implicitly constructivist is growing in number and diversity. I have drawn mainly upon those that are directly relevant to my investigation into the socializing effect of regional institutions. I do not include constructivist studies that are not concerned with institutions and socialisation, such as those which focus primarily on domestic politics (like Japan's anti-militaristic norm, the emergence of a Taiwanese identity), bilateral relations (like the US-South Korea alliance, or mainland China-Taiwan relations) or the foreign policy or strategic behavior of individual states (like Johnston's study of China's 'cultural realism'(Johnston 1998). Next, with some exceptions (like its attention to epistemic communities), the essay is state-centric, even though in need not be so. Constructivist accounts can fully accommodate the role of both states and civil society actors (not just Track-II bodies) in regional cooperation. But consistent with the mandate given to this author, I have accepted here as a fair assumption that Asian regional institutions, reflecting the domestic politics of many states, are primarily inter-governmental organizations, even though their ideational (as opposed to material) resources derive from epistemic communities as much as states. It is in relation to state behavior that their impact must be primarily judged, even though increasingly regional institutions are subject to pressures from a transnational civil society.

Constructivism in International Relations Theory

Constructivism is a relatively new perspective on international relations. Although some trace its genesis to the work of the English School of international relations beginning in the 1950s, it emerged as a distinctive label in the late 1980s and acquired growing popularity in the 1990s (Hopf 1998; Checkel 1998). Today, some would see it as having acquired a status (and a dominance) comparable to realism and liberalism, although this would be stretching the truth, except perhaps in Europe. There are vigorous academic debates over what constructivism stands for and whether it's a full-fledged or substantive 'theory' (like realism, liberalism or institutionalism) or a 'meta-theory', a philosophical position and an ontology that does not offer causal arguments that are falsifiable and testable (Moravcsik 2001; Risse and Wiener 2001). In the latter view, constructivism, like rational choice, is more of a method than a theory per se. (Checkel 1998). There are significant differences between American Wendtian constructivism, which tends to be social-scientific, or 'softly rational', as Ernst Haas (2001) put it , and a European variety which stresses argumentative rationality and leans more towards reflectivism (Christiansen, Jorgensen and Wiener 2001:17). There may even be a possible Asian strand distinguished by claims of regional exceptionalism (the uniqueness of Asians culture and tradition as the basis of its international relations, see: Kang 2003) and constitutive localization of ideas and norms (Acharya 2004, 2007). Moreover, although its initial popularity was due to its claim to challenge rationalist (neo-realist and neo-liberal) theories, there is a growing consensus that these and the constructivist perspective are complimentary rather than antithetical. Hence the growing talk about a rationalist-constructivist synthesis (Checkel 2005).

Notwithstanding these debates, it is fair to say that constructivism makes some fundamental claims about the nature of international relations which set it apart from other theories including realism and liberalism. Five are especially noteworthy.

The first is that agents (e.g. states) and structures (the international system) are mutually constitutive. This goes against structuralist theories, such as neo-realism, which holds that state behavior is determined by structure, i.e. anarchy (the absence of a higher authority above the state) and the distribution of power (e.g. bipolarity, multipolarity). For structural perspectives, unit level variables (domestic politics, democracy or autocracy), human nature (good or bad leaders), or the action of agents (norm entrepreneurs, including civil society groups), are not decisive in shaping conflict and cooperation. Constructivists on the other hand believe that states, leaders, transnational moral agents and civil society groups affect the international system and are shaped by it.

Second, constructivism argues that the interests and identities of actors (states) are not a given, or preordained, but are shaped by their interactions with other actors. To quote the title of Wendt's (1992) classic essay, "anarchy is what states make of it". This challenges the 'rationalist' logic of theories that hold that states already "know who they are and what they want" before they enter into international interactions.

A third claim of constructivism is that international relations is shaped not just by material forces, but also by ideational ones, including culture, ideas and norms. Constructivism has been a major factor in the return of culture and identity to the study of international relations, after it became unfashionable in the West as a result the behavioural revolution. Constructivists have taken up the study of cultural determinants of foreign policy, security and

economics, the best known examples being *The Culture of National Security,* a collection of essays linking culture and security issues, edited by Peter Katzenstein (1996), or Iain Johnston's *Cultural Realism* (1998), which examined the cultural determinants of China's strategic behavior. Few constructivists would claim exclusive causality for ideas, but many would argue, following Wendt (1999), that in explaining international relations, one should turn to ideas first and then turn to material forces to explain residual phenomena. It is fair to say that many followers of constructivism see it is an "ideas-first", rather than "ideas-all-the-way-down" theory. Others give ideas at least equal space. Moreover, constructivists do not see ideas as mere 'hooks' for strategic action or self-interested behavior aimed at achieving parochial goals, but as instruments of normative action that can transform international relations.

This leads to a fourth key argument of constructivism; it concerns the transformative effects on norms. Constructivists (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Checkel 1998; Risse, Ropp and Sikkink 1999) believe that states are guided by a logic of appropriateness, rather than by a logic of consequences (or consequentialism). Norms play a crucial role in deciding what is legitimate and appropriate and what is not. Norms matter; they can and do trump power- and interest-driven behavior. Norms can tame or constrain power politics by delegitimizing it (Acharya 2009). Once accepted, norms develop a sticky quality and tend to reproduce themselves. Norms help the socialisation of new actors into a community.

Finally, constructivism takes a deeper view of the impact of international institutions. Institutions are central to the constructivist view of international relations. Realists often dismiss international institutions as marginal to the game of international politics, some consider them as adjuncts to power balancing behavior. Institutions are as good as their great power patrons want them to be. Liberals see international institutions as having a more meaningful role. Classical liberalism stressed the collective security function of international institutions. A more recent strand of liberalism, 'neo-liberal institutionalism' (Keohane 1989), while regarding the international system as anarchic (thus agreeing with neorealism), nonetheless finds cooperation to be possible because institutions promote transparency (information flows), reduce transaction costs, and discourage cheating. Constructivists have significantly redefined and broadened the neo-liberal institutionalist perspective on how institutions work by moving away from its contractual view of cooperation based on reciprocity and rational calculation of cost and benefit. According to constructivist theory, international institutions, formal and informal, act as 'teachers' of norms (Finnemore 1993) and provide an environment for socialization (Johnston 2001), in which "actors internalize the norms which then influence how they see themselves and what they perceive as their interests." (Risse and Wiener 2001:202). Instead of strategic calculation, constructivist view of how institutions work focuses on the micro-processes of persuasion and social influence. Constructivists thus argue that international institutions not only regulate state behavior, they also have a constitutive effect on states, meaning institutions can change state interests and reconstitute their identities. Together with norms, institutions can transform anarchy and push a group of states onto a path towards 'security communities' in which war among states become unthinkable (Adler and Barnett 1998).

Recent non-Western, including Asian, contributions to the constructivist view of international institutions have moved it beyond its origins within a Western discourse and context. Two lines of advance can be discerned. The first is that international institutions may matter even if they are not fully backed by the great powers or when they are led by weak states in the face of great power indifference or opposition. Unlike realism which is a theory of

the 'weak in the world of the strong', constructivism offers a theory of 'the strong in the world of the weak'. Weak states resorting to norm-based action and working through cooperative institutions can resist the material hegemony of great powers and influence power politics (Acharya 2009). Second, constructivism even more so than regime theory, offers a way of understanding why states cooperate even in the absence of strong formalistic, legalistic institutions, like the European Union. Constructivism focuses on the transformative and constitutive role of ideas and norms, which can be diffused and shared with or without formal organizations with large, permanent bureaucracies (Acharya 1997, 2009).

It should be noted that constructivism not only describes a worldview or conditions for peaceful change, it also has prescriptive function that includes specifying *strategies of* change induced by socialisation. As Johnston (2008:xvi) argues, "there is also a great deal of policy space for socialisation arguments. After all, governmental and non-governmental diplomacy is often an effort to persuade, shame, cajole, and socially 'pressure' states to change their collective minds and behavior." Some of the key documents of Asian regionalism, reflect a constructivist logic of socialization. (Severino,2006; East Asia Vision Group 2001; East Asia Study Group 2002) Strategies of socialisation, constructivism's signature contribution to international relations theory and practice, is an approach employed by states in opposition to *realpolitik* approaches of engagement such as balancing, bandwagoning or buck-passing. Socialisation is a way of generating counter-*realpolitik* behavior in states that are being socialised.

Constructivism and the Study of Asian Regionalism

It is useful to remind ourselves that Asian regionalism as a distinctive field of study is remarkably new, and that until recently, it had remained largely atheoretical. The study of Asian regionalism has in recent years become increasingly theoretical. And I would argue that constructivist approaches, or studies underpinned by constructivist assumptions as identified earlier, have made a number of important contributions to the study of Asian regional institutions.

The first concerns the question of regional definition. Challenging the traditional geographic and geopolitical view of regions, constructivists argue that the there can be no preordained, permanent or changeless regions. Regions are social constructs, whose boundaries are subject to negotiation and change. Such characterizations apply whether one is speaking of Southeast Asia, which has been likened to an 'imagined community' (Acharya 2000), or the larger East Asia (Evans 1999) and Asia-Pacific regions. As Pempel (2005: 24-25) put it, while "East Asia today is a much more closely knit region than it was at the end of World War II or even a decade ago", there is "no single map of East Asia is so inherently self-evident and logical as to preclude the consideration of equally plausible alternatives." It should be noted that critical international relations scholars also challenge regional definitions as givens. Dirlik (1992) for example characterised the "Asia-Pacific idea" as a matter more of representation than reality: an artificial construct that rationalizes elite interests. Constructivists do not necessarily share such skepticism about regional construction and identity. Neither do they agree on the question whether regions are constructed from *within* or from *without*. But unlike realists who often think of regions as extensions of great power geopolitics, constructivism makes greater allowance for the bottom-up construction of regions.

This leads to a second insight of constructivist analysis of Asian regional institutions: how do they differ from the European variety. This debate has acquired a huge following thanks to European funded projects and conferences. But the most insightful contribution to this debate comes from a constructivist scholar (admittedly with an 'eclectic' perspective that combines power and interest variables with ideational ones): Peter Katzenstein. Katzenstein (2005) argues that regionalism in both Europe and Asia is shaped by American-led processes of globalization and internationalisation, and are underpinned by regional production structures led by a 'core state' serving US interests: Germany in Europe and Japan in Asia. But while Europe's regionalism is much more institutionalized and legalized and marked by supranational governance, Asia's is late, sovereignty bound, informal and non-legalistic. The reason for this has to do not only with differing domestic structures (Asia's non-Weberian polities versus Europe's Weberian ones), but also – and this is the constructivist element in his contribution – with international norms, such as Asia's adherence to the norm of "open regionalism", and variations in identification. While Katzenstein's position on 'core states' has not gone unchallenged (Aggarwal, et. al. 2007), especially from those who argue, among other things, that the characterization of Japanese dominance in Asian regional production structures is getting rapidly out of date in the face of a rising China, he does address one of the key puzzles of Asian regional institutionalism: why did post-War Asia not develop a multilateral institution? While realists explain the puzzle by pointing to American's "extreme hegemony" in the early post-war period as a factor inhibiting multilateralism, and liberals do so by pointing to the region's initial lack of economic interdependence, constructivists point not only to the role of identity and norms. For Katzenstein, US perceptions of a greater collective identity with its European partners as a community of equals led it to encourage NATO-like multilateralism in Europe; the absence of such identification and the perception of Asia an inferior community led it to shun multilateralism there (Katzenstein, 2005; Hemmer and Katzenstein, 2001). Another constructivist explanation looks beyond the US-Asia identity dissonance and argues that the late development of Asian multilateralism could be explained in terms of the normative beliefs and preferences of Asian actors against great power led security multilateralism (Acharya 2009).

Third, constructivism has done much to highlight the specific and unique design features of Asian institutions. The literature on ASEAN (or the so-called 'ASEAN Way', authored largely by constructivist scholars, identifies the informal, non-legalistic, consensus-based and process-driven approach to coordination and collaboration developed by ASEAN (Acharya 1997, Busse 1999, Nischalke 2000; Haacke 2002, Anthony 2005). These design features of ASEAN have also been grafted onto the wider Asia Pacific institutions such as APEC and ARF. Aside from defining the latter's institutional characteristics, ASEAN's design features also underscore its role as the 'driver' of these wider institutions. There has been much debate as to whether the ASEAN Way has always been upheld in practice. But what is clear that it has come under increasing strain in recent years as ASEAN and other institutions face new transnational challenges such as financial crises, pandemics, terrorism, etc. ASEAN itself is under growing pressure to legalise itself, and has responded to these pressures by drafting and adopting an ASEAN Charter. Some of the institutional mechanisms of ASEAN, such as the ASEAN Free Trade Area and Agreement on Transboundary Pollution, show increasing legalization. APEC's move towards legalization is also worth noting, although this has stalled as a result of the setbacks to its trade liberalization program. The ARF remains weakly institutionalized and severely under-legalized. Its confidence-building agenda is based on voluntary efforts, and its development of a preventive diplomacy and mediation role has stalled.

A fourth insight of constructivism into Asian regionalism concerns the role of ideas and epistemic communities in the development of regional institutions, especially Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). It is true that the leading figures of the Pacific Cooperation movement were neoclassical economists, and economic liberals (Woods 1993). But their role in developing first PECC and subsequently APEC cannot be understood without applying a constructivist perspective on the role of knowledge or epistemic communities (non-official or semiofficial transnational expert groups). Although not strictly a constructivist work, John Ravenhill's (2001) study of APEC takes a composite approach to examine both the material as well as the ideational sources of APEC. He puts the role of knowledge groups (especially the advocates of the 'Pacific Community' idea in the 1970s and 80s who were deeply involved in Pacific Economic Cooperation Council - the precursor to APEC) and their ideas ("open regionalism") alongside the distribution of power, interdependence and domestic politics, as the mix of forces that produced APEC. In this respect, his book differs from rationalist accounts of APEC's emergence (Drysdale 1988; Kahler 1994; Aggarwal 1993, Aggarwal and Morrison 1998). The role of the ASEAN Institutes of International and Strategic Studies(ASEAN-ISIS) and the Council on Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) in developing policy proposals and serving as a filter of ideas for ASEAN and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) are similar testimony to the role of epistemic communities in fostering cooperation and institution-building (Anthony 2005; for a 'radical' constructivist view of these epistemic communities, see Tan 2007).

The fifth contribution concerns the role of ASEAN, the first truly viable regional institution in Asia. Here, Acharya (2001, 2009), Haacke (2002), Caballero-Anthony (2005), and Ba (2009), have each made well-known constructivist contributions to the understanding of ASEAN. Their relative focus differs, however. My book (2001) uses the concept of "security community" (a group of states which rule out the use of force in resolving their conflicts) originally developed by Karl Deutsch and his associates and reformulated by Adler and Barnett (2008) as an analytical tool to examine ASEAN's strengths as well as limitations. Despite its stated intention to stay away from the question of ASEAN's current status as a security community, the book has fuelled a heated controversy precisely over this question: whether ASEAN should or should not be regarded as a pluralistic security community. And while my work places strong emphasis on norms and local agency, others like Ba, give more play to the socialisation involving external actors. Haacke's idea of diplomatic and security culture is essentially constructivist, albeit influenced by Michael Leifer's (his doctoral supervisor) soft realism, while Ba avoids the security community debate and employs an ideational and "social negotiations" (dialogues, meetings) approach to trace the evolution of ASEAN's norms and its extension to East Asian great powers (China and Japan).

Despite these differences, they share a fit with constructivist assumptions in the following respects. First, they highlight the role of ideational forces - norms, identity, community and strategic culture - in the origin and evolution of ASEAN. Ideational assets are key in explaining ASEAN's emergence and effectiveness:

"The role of norms and identity-building is especially important for the study of Southeast Asian regionalism because its material resources and bureaucratic organization are thin indeed. ASEAN regionalism has been primarily a normative regionalism. Hence, no serious investigation of ASEAN can be complete without consideration of the role of norms and the issue of identity-formation. For the same reason, the concept of community is an important

analytic tool for investigating Southeast Asian regionalism and regional order. This is because the notion of security community allows the use of norms and identity as analytic tools to investigate international relations, while neorealism or neoliberalism would ignore such variables. (Acharya 2005)

Other shared threads among constructivist works on ASEAN are their investigations into ASEAN's constraining impact on inter-state conflicts and great power behavior, and the strengths and limits of ASEAN's informal regionalism, including the extension of the ASEAN model to East Asia and Asia-Pacific. In these respects, these contributions dissent from Michael Leifer's soft realist account of ASEAN (Leifer 1989), on Shaun Narine's (2002) essentially realist account (although his subsequent work on ASEAN has embraced the English School's international society perspective). Much of the above constructivist work concerns ASEAN's political and security cooperation. There is yet to be a significant constructivist account of ASEAN economic cooperation, to match Nesadurai's (Nesadurai 2003) domestic politics-centered account of trade liberalization.

Sixth, constructivism has done much to explain the emergence, activities, and performance of wider Asia-Pacific and East Asian regional institutions. Initial work on this started as an extension of research on ASEAN, not surprising since ASEAN has been the institutional hub (and sometimes the driver) of Asia-Pacific and East Asian regionalism. Here, constructivists' accounts (Acharya 1997; Ba 2009, Johnston 1999) have explored the benefits and pitfalls of extending the ASEAN process ('Way") to Asia-Pacific regionalism (can a sub-regionally developed approach it work in such a larger and more complex setting involving so many great powers). Constructivists generally believe that it can.

Constructivists (Acharya 2003) believe that the major contribution of Asian institutions is normative. Asian institutions act as sites of normative contestation, creation - "norm breweries" to use Katsumata's (2006) term - and localization. While Asian regionalism is influenced by global norms, these norms are not imported wholesale, but are "localized" by regional actors to suit their own context and need and in accordance with their prior beliefs and practices. Thus, the usefulness and relevance of these normative discourses carried through regional institutions is enhanced by such "constitutive localization" (Acharya 2004). A related subsequent line of investigation concerns the socialising effects of security institutions, particularly the ASEAN Regional Forum. Iain Johnston's *Social States* (2008), not strictly a study of Asian regionalism, but of China's participation in international institutions during 1980-2000, cautiously argues in support of the ARF's influence in inducing a more cooperative behavior by China. Katsumata's forthcoming book on the ARF (2009) is far more forthright in claiming that the ARF has had a substantial impact on the strategic preferences and behavior of China, Japan and the United States, the three principal powers of the Asia Pacific. This would certainly add to a particularly contentious ongoing debate over the ARF which was triggered by Leifer's (1996) skeptical view of The ASEAN Regional Forum which pointed to what he terms as the ARF's 'structural flaw": the professed goal of a group of weak states (ASEAN) to manage the balance of power in a region which contains practically all the great powers of the international system. The ARF in his view can at best be an adjunct to the balance of power game played by the great powers; instead of influencing it, it will be influenced by it. Moreover, the success of ARF depends on a prior balance of power, by which he meant an equitable distribution of power. On the other side of the debate are constructivists who have turned the balance of power logic on its head by arguing that norm-guided socialisation led by ASEAN's weaker states can actually shape

great power geopolitics and that the restraint induced by the ARF is key to maintaining a stable balance of power in the region. This theme is also captured by Ralf Emmers' (2003) study of ARF which represents an attempt to reconcile realism and institutionalism.

Socialisation and Asian Regional Institutions

This leads us to a discussion of the socialising role of Asian regional institutions, the principal theme of this essay. What evidence is there that Asian institutions have had a role in socialisation and how effective have they been in socializing their member states? To consider this meaningfully, we must first have an understanding of what socialisation means, what are its causal mechanisms, how to we measure the success of failure of socialisation, and what are the conditions that determines the success/failure of socialisation mechanisms.

In a broad and simple sense, socialisation means getting new actors to adopt the rules and norms of a community on a long-term basis without the use of force or coercion. There are four key aspects to this definition. First and foremost, socialisation's key ingredient is norms. Socialisation implies norm transmission by socialisers resulting in pro-norm behavior by the socialisee. Risse (1997:16) emphasises processes "resulting in the internalisation of norms so that they assume their 'taken-for-granted' nature" as the core aspect of socialisation; while Ikenberry and Kupchan (1990:289-90) define socialisation as a process of learning in which the norms and ideals are transmitted by one party to another." Second, for constructivists, such norm transmission that underlies socialisation is pacific and non-coercive. There is no socialisation through force or conquest, the key mechanism of socialisation is persuasion. Third, socialisation is directed at newcomers, or novices. Fourth, socialisation leads to long-term and stable change in behavior, rather than short term adaptation. Checkel's definition of socialisation which draws upon previous writings on the subject, including sociological perspectives, is useful to borrow. Socialisation is:

> defined as a process of inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given community. Its outcome is sustained compliance based on the norms and rules of a given community. In adopting community rules, socialisation implies that an agent switches from following a logic of consequences to a logic of appropriateness; this adoption is sustained over time and is quite independent from a particular structure of material incentives or sanctions. (Checkel 2005:804, reference marks deleted)

I should clarify that my dependent variable is socialisation, getting new actors to follow the rules of the group, rather than attainment of peace and prosperity. Judging socialisation is different from judging the instrumental efficacy of institutions.

The insights of the constructivist literature on socialisation can be summarized as follows:

1. Whereas previous works on socialisation focused more on the motivations and role of 'socialisers', more recent works (especially Johnston, 2008; Acharya, 2004, 2009), investigate it from the perspective of the 'socialisee' or the norm-taker. In other words, in understanding socialisation, it is more important to understanding the domestic and external conditions of the socialisee/ persuade/ norm taker as that of socialiser/persuader/norm giver.

2. International institutions play a vital role in socialisation, whether as promoters of socialisation from outside or as sites of socialisation (when the socialisee is a member of the institution)

3. There is no one pathway to socialisation. Mechanisms of socialisation can include strategic calculation (whereby the target actor calculates that the benefits of socialisation exceeds its costs) and bargaining, as well as persuasion, teaching, mimicking, social influence, argumentation, "role playing" or normative suasion. The shift to a logic of appropriateness is not necessarily a shift to what is morally appropriate, but to what is socially appropriate, from a calculation of what is instrumentally beneficial to the socialisee (logic of consequences).

4. The dependent variable of socialisation (when we know socialisation has taken place) is internalisation of "the values, roles, and understandings held by a group that constitutes the society of which the actor becomes a member. Internalisation implies, further, that these values, roles, and understandings take on the character of 'taken-for-grantedness'…" (Johnston 2007:21). The degree of internalisation may vary, however. Socialisation may or may not involve a fundamental redefinition of the interests and identities of the target, sometimes, the target may agree to play by the rules of the group it is being inducted without developing a "we feeing". Checkel distinguishes between Type I socialisation, where the socialisee has accepted new roles out of instrumental calculations (incentive-based) in order to conform to the expectations of a community it seeks to belong, but does not necessarily likes it or agrees with it, and Type II socialisation, where genuine and long-term (taken for granted) changes to the interests and values of the socialisee have occurred, and where new roles and behavioral changes reflect a new normative conception that "it's the right thing to do" (Checkel 2005: 808, 813).

5. Socialisation depends on a number of conditions. Zurn and Checkel's (2005: 1055) list of scope conditions of socialisation includes properties of the international institutions that trigger socialisation, properties of the political systems and agents that become socialised, properties of the issues or norms regarding which socialisation takes place, and properties of the interaction between socializing and socialised agents, e.g. intensity of contact, style of discourse. A more selective and specific set of hypotheses about socialisation may be derived from the literature on persuasion, an important mechanism or 'micro process' of socialisation (Checkel and Moravcsik, 2001; Checkel 2005). According to this literature, persuasion is more likely to succeed if (a) the target actors are in a new and uncertain environment, (b) if the prior and ingrained beliefs of the persuade does not clash with the beliefs and messages of the persuader, (c) if the persuader is an authoritative member of the in-group to which persuade wishes to belong, (d) if the persuader itself sets the example and acts out the principles of deliberative argument and, (e) if the interaction occurs in setting that is relatively less politicized or more insulated from public opinion and pressure ('in-camera setting'). (For a more extensive list of the 'scope conditions' but generalized out of European cases, see Checkel 2005: 813; Zurn and Checkel 2005). Other determinants of socialisation include group size, intensity and frequency of contact and shared identity among the persuader and the persuade.

How do these conditions apply to Asian regionalism? To investigate this question, I focus on three main cases of socialisation through regional institutions in Asia: Vietnam, China and India. (One might plausibly include the US here, but I have kept America out on grounds of regional belonging and identity). I discuss below these three cases in terms of the insights of the socialisation literature outlined above.

Table 1: Key Norms of Asian Regional Institutions

Institutions	ASEAN	APEC	ARF
Norms (Substantive)	Non-interference; Pacific settlement of disputes; Primacy of regional solutions; Avoidance of multilateral military pacts reflecting great power rivalry; One Southeast Asia concept	Open regionalism; market-driven regionalisation	Common/cooperative security, Inclusiveness; non-interference, avoidance of NATO-style military cooperation
Norms (Procedural)	Consensus; Informalism; Voluntary compliance	Flexible consensus; Concerted unilateralism; Soft institutionalism	Consensus; ASEAN leadership; Voluntary Compliance

The first area to look at concerns the socialisee's imperative. In each of these cases, the changing domestic conditions (including regime legitimacy and survival) of the target have been critical. Deng Xiaoping's reforms in China (inspired by domestic economic pressure, ideological shift, regime insecurity, and a desire to restore China's standing in the world) beginning in the late 1970s, Vietnam's withdrawal from Cambodia (induced by domestic economic failure earlier in the 1980s created by the burden of its occupation of Cambodia), and India's crisis-induced (a severe balance of payments crisis and near default on foreign debt) liberalization in the early 1990s, paved the way for critical foreign policy shifts leading to their eventual membership in regional institutions. External conditions, especially the end of the Cold War have also been a critical factor, but not sufficient by itself to explain why these countries chose to be socialised, since the end of the Cold War did not generate similar responses from North Korea. Moreover, the socialisation of the three states did not begun simultaneously, Vietnam's was first and perhaps most advanced, China's was second in sequence, followed by India. And the socialisation of China and India has not progressed to the same extent. Hence domestic conditions and the preferences of the *socialisee*, is the more important variable here, than the singular external event, end of the Cold War.

The second area is the role of institutions, especially regional ones. There is little doubt that regional institutions have been critical in the socialisation process, both before and after the target states became formal members. While ASEAN has been the most important institution for Vietnam, the ARF has been especially important for China. For India, the prospect of becoming an ASEAN dialogue partner and a member of ARF and the East Asian Summit has been similarly important. Once they have become members, regional institutions have become sites of dialogues, rule-making and creation of new mechanisms of cooperation.

The third, the issue of strategic calculation, versus persuasion/argumentation/ social influence, is especially important. No one can exclude strategic calculation on the part of the three states in engaging and being engaged by these institutions. For Vietnam, membership in ASEAN offered an opportunity to attract foreign investment, even before the AFTA and ASEAN Investment Area, and a platform to cushion its reentry into the international system after a decade of isolation due to its occupation of Cambodia. It also meant diplomatic support (albeit implicit and limited) for its territorial claim (Spratlys and Paracels) against China (in the sense that its bilateral dispute with China now became a China-ASEAN issue). For China, the strategic calculation in joining the ARF, despite substantial misgivings, would have been the opportunity afforded by ARF as a platform to launch a 'charm offensive' and reduce the perceptions of the 'China threat'. Neutralizing Taiwan's influence-seeking in Southeast Asia through trade and investment was also important. For India, improving its then dismal economic condition, having ASEAN as its bridge with the prosperous East Asian neighbours, and strategic competition with China, were important motivations that a rationalist framework would easily recognize.

But as noted, constructivists accept that norm compliance and socialisation is not inconsistent with self-interested behavior. The key is whether what we are witnessing is pacific, long-term, and transformative (in the sense that they involve a redefinition of interests and identities, and not simply short-term adaptation and reluctant role-playing). The jury is still out on this question. But certain important indicators of internalisation are visible in each cases, in which regional institutions have played an important role, whether as external promoters or sites of socialisation.

Turning to Vietnam first, there is considerable evidence that Vietnam has accepted and internalised ASEAN's non-intervention norm, in contrast to its past disregard and violation of the norm, evident in its support for communist movements in neighbouring Southeast Asian states, its grand scheme of an Indochinese federation dominated by itself, and its invasion and occupation of Cambodia. In the case of China, the key change has been the shift from an exclusively bilateral approach to conflict management to a multilateral approach. This is evident in its acceptance of multilateral talks with ASEAN on the South China Sea dispute leading to a Declaration on the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (not yet a full-fledged legal instrument or code, but an important step towards it; further progress towards such a code will be key test of its internalisation of multilateralism norm). China's growing support for the ARF despite earlier misgivings about it, is also important. My research offers a graphic account of the conceptual shift in Chinese thinking on multilateralism in the 1990s. Johnston (2007) provides considerable evidence of changes to Chinese bureaucratic and decision-making structures that support the internalisation of new norms of multilateralism. As for India, the key change is in the economic arena: it's evident in India's gradual shift from economic nationalism and protectionism to trade liberalization and openness to foreign direct investment. Again, this shift is occurring (albeit haltingly) not just because of regional institutions, but regional institutions have provided key sites for the change, including the negotiations over the ASEAN-India Free Trade Agreement and India's own interest in developing an Asian Free Trade Area (as well as prospective membership in APEC, as yet unrealized but an incentive for accepting free trade liberalization norms). What is striking about India's membership in ASEAN, ARF and EAS is that unlike the 1940s and 50s, when India was the leading provider of Asian regionalist ideas and a key force behind Asian multilateral conferences (such as the Asian Relations Conference of 1947 and 49 and the Asia-Africa Conference of 1955), it is now following someone else' (ASEAN's) lead in regionalism.

These instances of internalisation (as indicator of socialisation) have their limits. China does not accept a preventive diplomacy role (signifying deeper multilateralism) for the ARF, or resorting to multilateralism in addressing the Taiwan issue, and India is not yet a full convert to free trading with East Asian countries, or to multilateralism in resolving the Kashmir conflict . But while not comprehensive, in my judgment, their normative and behavioral shifts are irreversible. There is no going back to the Indochinese federation for Vietnam, exclusive bilateralism for China and the Nehruvian socialism for India. And it is fair to say that these shifts are induced by socialisation through regional institutions, although not exclusively by them. Regional institutions have helped to create and reinforce the convergence between domestic interests, strategic calculation and international behavior.

The evidence seen thus far suggests the possibility of a Type III internalisation, in addition to Checkel's Type I (states acting in accordance with group expectations "irrespective of whether they like the role or agree with it"), and Type II in which there is real value and interest change leading agents to "adopt the interests, or even possibly the identity, of the community of which they are a part." (Checkel 2005:804). In either case, instrumental calculation, which may be initially present as a mechanism of socialisation, has been replaced by a logic of appropriateness. Although Checkel calls for a "double interpretation" of every instance of socialisation, once from the perspective of constructivism and once from the perspective of rational choice, he is quite clear on what socialisation entails; in order to be socialised, whether into a Type I or a Type II outcome, states must discard instrumental calculation (logic of consequences) in favour of logic of appropriateness. (Checkel 2005:804). By contrast, I suggest a Type III internalisation to refer to a condition in which agents act both instrumentally and normatively, concurrently, and on a more or less permanent basis. Moreover, in Type III internalisation a key factor in determining the outcome may be the logic of expediency. Creating a room for states to determine their own pace within regional institutions/agreements is an important enabler for Type III internalisation, in which states act both instrumentally and normatively, concurrently, to support regional cooperation and integration. In this situation, states tend to pursue new initiatives or new directions at a pace comfortable to all stakeholders. Yet this is no short-term shift from purely instrumental calculation and behavior, the shift is irreversible, even though it may or may not lead to Type II internalisation, in which values and interests change permanently.

Type III internalisation is what best describes the socialising effects of Asian regional institutions today on newcomers. While the socialisee (China, India, Vietnam) are not in the danger of backtracking, they need more time and convincing before fully committing to the new norms and roles to an extent where interest and identity transformation becomes discernable. And they may never get to that stage. In other words, Type III internalisation may or may not be an intermediary stage or the tipping point between Type I and Type II. Moreover, Type III internalisation may not be comprehensive in terms of issue areas. Vietnam, China and India have all committed to non-interference, multilateralism, and trade regionalism, respectively and irrevocably, but they each have not embraced all the three areas, at least to the same degree. Uneven socialisation and internalisation is thus a feature of Type III socialisation.

Table 2: Types of Socialisation/internalisation

	Type I	Type II	Type III
Agent's (Socialisee) motivation	To be socially accepted by satisfying group expectations	Because "it's the right thing to do"	To be socially accepted by finding the best fit between self-interest and group purpose
Indicator of internalisation	Learning and playing new roles even when the agent may not like it or agree with it	Changes in interests and identities that can be "taken for granted"	Learning new roles that it agrees with, with some redefinition of its interests and identities
Logic of action	Logic of appropriateness	Logic of appropriateness	Logic of consequences and logic of appropriateness

Finally, let me turn to the conditions of socialisation, which are important in answering the question why internalisation, even if to such limited degree, has taken place in Asia. Of the five conditions outlined above, the new and uncertain strategic and economic environment of the post-Cold War era has certainly been an important factor; Khong (2004) has argued that the principal mission of Asian regional institutions have been to reduce and manage uncertainty. Uncertainty (about the US military posture, the rise of China and its strategic intent and behavior, competition between China and Japan, the appearance of regional trade blocs due to NAFTA and European Union's Single Market was the key element of the security discourse of the post-Cold War period and it certainly help to focus the purpose and direction of Asia's regional institutions. The second condition is consistent with my norm localization argument, i.e. norm diffusion is more likely to be successful if it's congruent with the prior beliefs and practices of the norm-taker. Since norms are important to socialisation, it is important o recognize that certain norms promoted by external players (Australia, Canada, Gorbachev's Russia), such as 'open regionalism' in the economic arena and 'cooperative security' in the security arena have been accepted in Asia (by ASEAN states and China) because they were congruent (or made to appear as such by norm entrepreneurs from Canada and Australia) with the prior beliefs and practices of the local actors, which included ASEAN's prior multilateralism and its openness to foreign direct investment. By contrast, norms of humanitarian intervention and EU-style free trade failed to diffuse in East Asia because of their clash with prior local norms of non-intervention and developmental regionalism (Acharya 2004, 2009).

The third condition is also relevant in Asia: ASEAN as the chief forum for socialisation had an aura of authoritativeness (at least before the 1997 crisis) which made it attractive for China, India and Vietnam to participate in ASEAN-led regional institutions. This authoritativeness had to do with ASEAN's relative longevity (the oldest viable regional political grouping in Asia), its role in the Cambodia peace process, its own intra-mural peace, and its system of dialogue relationships with the major powers. ASEAN had also shown both willingness and ability to act out its own norms of non-intervention and non-use of force (notwithstanding the fact that the meaning of non-intervention remains contested here, ASEAN supported fellow regimes facing internal threats and this particular norm is now subject to increasing challenge). Its authority as a socialiser is also the result of the fact that no other country or group of countries in Asia are in a similar position to provide leadership due to their past failures (India),

mutual rivalry (China-Japan) or smallness and security preoccupations (South Korea), or outsider-ness (USA, Australia, Canada, Russia, etc).

The centrality of ASEAN in Asian regionalism also raises the question of the content of norms as a condition for socialisation. In the European context, the examples of such norms which are often cited as conditions of socialisation are minority rights or democratic procedures (Zurn and Checkel 2005: 1055). In Asia, the norms that most influence socialisation are not those of human rights or democracy, but domestic non-interference and regional autonomy. Without the centrality of non-interference in the domestic affairs of states espoused by ASEAN, it is unlikely that China or Vietnam (or Burma) would have been drawn into APEC, ARF and EAS. Its sister norm is non-intervention by outside powers in regional affairs, or regional autonomy, and relatedly the intent to explore indigenous solutions to regional problems. This, and the related tendency to localize foreign norms to suit regional context and need in accordance with prior beliefs and practices, has not been that crucial in Europe, but is of considerable salience in Asia's postcolonial context, even though it does not imply the exclusion of outside powers from the region.

Last but not the least, is the final condition of socialisation, the importance of having an "in-camera" setting. This condition suggests that socialisation is more likely to succeed in an authoritarian setting than in a pluralistic one, where the impact of public scrutiny and pressure group influence is more likely to occur and be felt. If this is true, and there is no reason why it should not be, (the success of authoritarian ASEAN governments in forming and developing the association is one example), then it challenges those who argue that democracies are more likely to building lasting and more effective institutions, including security communities. And herein lies a possible challenge to the socialising role of Asian regional institutions. As governments in ASEAN and Asia generally increasingly confront the forces of democratization, could their regional institutions keep up with the task of fostering and deepening socialisation? Unlike European institutions, Asian regional groups have not made democracy a condition of membership or rewards. In fact, they have been illiberal and have attracted new members and support by holding up the prospect of non-intervention as a reward. There is a chance that democratization may disrupt this apparent authoritarian bent of Asian regional institutions. But on the positive side, there is no evidence that democratization has induced inter-state war in East Asia and disrupted regionalization or regionalism. On the contrary, it may foster a cooperative security dynamic as evident under recently democratising regimes in South Korea and Indonesia. (Acharya, manuscript)

Table 3: Socialisation of Vietnam, China and India

Institutions/ Members	ASEAN	APEC	ARF
Vietnam	Ended occupation of Cambodia in 1989; Signed the Paris Peace Agreement on Cambodia in 1991; Observer status in ASEAN in 1992; Full ASEAN membership in 1995; Chair (rotational) of ASEAN in 2001 and 2010. Leading role in drafting the Hanoi Plan of Action for ASEAN. Abandoned Indochinese federation concept (non-interference); Adheres to One Southeast Asia concept; Seeks peaceful settlement of South China Sea dispute but wants coverage of the South China Sea Code of Conduct to extend to the Paracels; Conservative and staunch champion of non-interference principle.	Joined APEC in 1998. Hosted APEC Summit in 2006 Growing domestic economic liberalisation consistent with open regionalism and market-driven regionalization.	Founding member in 1994; Chair of ARF 2001 and 2010. Inclusiveness: supported North Korea's admission to ARF Cooperative security: regular participation in the ARF's CBMs and capacity-building initiatives; Abandoned military alliance with the former Soviet Union; Seeks to balance but not contain China
China	Agreed to multilateral talks with ASEAN on the South China Sea dispute in 1995; Full Dialogue partner of ASEAN in 1996; Signatory to Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 2003; Willing to be the first Nuclear Weapon State to sign the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, proposed Free Trade Area with ASEAN in 2002, Agreement to be signed in 2010.	Joined in 1991 along with Taiwan. Accepts Open Regionalism, but supports development oriented agenda for APEC in preference to trade liberalization	Founding member in 1994. Inclusiveness: supported India's membership in ARF; Cooperative security: regular participation in CBMs and capacity-building initiatives; Leadership: initiated ARF's Security Policy Conference (ASPC - meeting of defence ministry senior officials) in 2004 Excludes Taiwan Issue; Opposes full preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution role for ARF; Opposes raising South China Sea dispute in ARF; Wants to ARF to remain consultative, rather than become a problem-solving forum
India	Sectoral Dialogue Partner of ASEAN in 1992; Signatory to Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 2003; Full dialogue partner in 2005; Willing to sign the Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon-Free	Sought APEC membership before the membership freeze, but denied.	Joined the ARF in 1996. Inclusiveness; Cooperative security through participation in confidence-building measures; Leadership in the ARF's maritime

Institutions/ Members	ASEAN	APEC	ARF
	Zone Treaty if asked as a Nuclear Weapon State; India-ASEAN Free Trade agreed in 2008	Growing if qualified conformity with Open Regionalism and trade liberalization	security and counter-terrorism initiatives; Seeks to balance but not contain China. Excludes Kashmir issue, even though Pakistan became an ARF member

Note: This table incorporates five key indicators of socialisation: (1) partial or full membership; (2) participation in key multilateral agreements with the institution and its members; (3) support for the core norms of the institution, (4) leadership and agenda-setting role (indicating interactive or passive participation); and (5) exclusion of issues from multilateral approach. It should be noted that neither China nor India can join ASEAN whose members alone have the right to host annual ASEAN and APEC leaders meetings and ARF's annual ministerial meeting; the relevant forum for them would be full dialogue partnership with ASEAN.

Of course, socialisation in Asia has not been uniformly successful, as the cases of North Korea and Myanmar demonstrate. But these failures can be explained to some extent by the absence of the scope conditions of socialization, especially frequency and intensity of contact and clash with the prior beliefs of the regimes. In both cases, the prior isolation of the regimes (and hence the low intensity and frequency of contact) is important. ASEAN's policy of Constructive Engagement of Myanmar in the 1990s did not involve direct talks with the regime. The Six-Party Talks with North Korea did provide a forum for contact, but it was clearly limited in scope, failing to address Pyongyang's regime insecurity, and paling in comparison with the frequency of dialogues among other participants, say between South Korea and US, US and Japan, and even US and China. Also important in both cases is the prior beliefs of the socialisee (which is closely related to regime type). To the extent that socialisation involves overcoming isolationist and autarchic domestic political ideology of the target regimes, the deep-seated paranoia of the regimes in North Korea and Myanmar underpinned by their ideologies of national self-reliance - *Juche* and 'Burmese Way to Socialism' respectively- conflicted with the call for openness (economic and political liberalisation, rather than democratisation) from the regional institutions. Finally, and this applies only to North Korea's case, ASEAN and ASEAN-led institutions like the ARF have been somewhat distant and indifferent interlocutors in Northeast Asian security affairs. The Six Party Talks have been an ad hoc process (in line with the US preference for *a la carte* multilateralism). A preestablished Northeast Asian subregional institution like ASEAN in Southeast Asia was not around to cushion the dialogue with North Korea. Instead of providing the forum for the socialisaiton of North Korea, such a mechanism is envisaged as a possible outcome of the Six-Party Talks. While the cases of North Korea and Myanmar attest to the failure of socialisationby Asian regional institutions, they do suggest the applicability of the conditions of socialisation identified by socialisaiton theory.

Table 4 Mechanisms of Socialization: Three Cases

Principal Mechanisms

Type I: **Strategic Calculation**
Type II: **Normative Suasion**/Teaching/Social Influence
Type III: **Bargaining**/Role Playing/Mimicking/Social Influence

Notes: Not all mechanisms may be present in every case of socialization. There may be overlap among the mechanisms, but the first one (in bold) in the above typology is the mechanisms that is most active under different types of internalisation. Because Type III internalisation is a hybrid, mechanisms from Type I and Type III may overlap with those in Type III. This is particularly true of mimicking and social influence; although Johnston considers them mainly as non-rationalist mechanisms, hence theoretically part of Type II, I include them in both Type I and Type II.

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1. ARF's Security Agenda: Confidence Building Measures and Preventive Diplomacy

Socialiser (ASEAN/Canada/Australia):

Strategic Calculation: Tame rising Chinese power.

Bargaining/Role Playing/Mimicking: Ensure ASEAN' in "driver's seat" (status), Australia and Canada live up to their image as middle power diplomacy and influence; Use collective pressure from China's neighbours to induce peaceful behavior.

Normative Suasion/Teaching/Social Influence: ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation; Familiarize China with multilateral negotiations and consensus building in the "ASEAN Way"; Seek "pacific settlement of disputes" in South China Sea.

Socialisee (China):

Strategic Calculation: Diffuse "China threat" theory; Ensure peaceful regional environment conducive to its own economic development; Enhance China's international status and demonstrate China's "peaceful rise"; Use ASEAN's support to influence US position towards China, especially any US approach towards "containing" China.

Bargaining/Role Playing/Social Influence: Adopt declaratory CBMs but prevent intrusive measures and binding agreements in the CBM and PD negotiations by adopting a limited definition of these concepts; Reject conflict resolution role for ARF.

Normative Suasion/Teaching: Offer China's own five principles of peaceful co-existence as basis for engaging and reassuring neighbours: "mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty; nonaggression; noninterference; equality and mutual benefit".

Outcome: Consistent with Type III internalisation. Scope conditions: reputation of the socialize (ASEAN), sustained and intense contact, consistency with socializee's prior norms, and in-camera setting.

2. APEC's Trade Liberalization (circa 1993-97)

Socialiser (US):

Strategic Calculation: Use ASEAN and APEC as a counter to EU single market
Bargaining/Role playing: introduce reciprocity into trade arrangements
Normative suasion: spread Washington Consensus principles

Socialisee (ASEAN):

Strategic Calculation: Use the US as a counter to EU's single market, Keep the engaged the US as a regional balancer against rising powers.
Bargaining/Role Playing/Mimicking: Prevent ASEAN's marginalization in APEC; Location of the APEC secretariat in Southeast Asia; Dilute strict reciprocity in trade agreements.
Normative Suasion/Teaching: promote ASEAN Way-like norms, such as developmental regionalism, flexible consensus and concerted unilateralism in APEC.

Outcome: Consistent with Type I internalisation. Scope conditions: persuader's lack of reputation as a socialiser, insufficient intensity and duration of contact, clash with the prior norms of socialisee.

3. ASEAN-India FTA (2004-9)

Socialiser (ASEAN):
Strategic Calculation: To use India as a balancer against China in Southeast Asia; To exploit trade and investment opportunities in India.
Bargaining/Role Playing: To gain access to India's large domestic market without granting it too many exceptions; To enhance ASEAN's reputation and status as a regional integrator and driver of wider Asian regionalism.
Normative Suasion/Teaching: Use ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, and open regionalism norms as basis for engaging India.

Socialisee (India):

Strategic Calculation: to use ASEAN as a stepping stone to regional influence in East Asia and balance China.
Bargaining: To protect elements of India's domestic sector from competition while gaining access to ASEAN's markets
Normative Suasion: India's historic cultural and normative links with Southeast Asia

Outcome: Consistent with Type II internalisation. Scope conditions: reputation of socialisee, length and intensity of socialisation, in-camera setting

Socialisation and Institutional-Design in Asia

As noted, institutions are central to the constructivist view of international relations, and socialisation is the core function of institutions. But how do the design features of institutions (institutional-design) shape socialisation? What sort of design features and most conducive to socialisation? And conversely, how does having socialisation as their objective shape

institutional-design? Socialisation is different from coercion, sanctions, or other types of negative incentives. Hence, different types of institutional design may offer different potential for success of socialisation. Constructivist theory holds that the best chance for success in socialisation lies with institutions which do not coerce or (materially) constrain, but persuade and (socially) pressure. These institutions are more likely to promote behavior on the basis of a logic of appropriateness rather than of consequences.

The literature is not uniform when it comes to identifying the elements of institutional-design, but the following five are important (Acharya and Johnston 2007):
1. Membership (inclusive or exclusive)
2. Scope (range of issue areas, multipurpose or issue-specific)
3. Decision-making rules (e.g. consensus as opposed to majority voting)
4. Ideology (including ideological flexibility)
5. Mandate (brainstorming as opposed to problem solving, distributive versus deliberative, 'process over the product')

To this list, one might add institutional foundation and linkages. "These two elements are most important particularly when an institution is at the stage of being proposed or is evolving. Knowing right on which existing regional institutions/agreements a new one should be founded, built on, branch out, and link up to could increase the possibility of its acceptability and success."[1]

The elements of institutional-design can affect the socialisation capacity of institutions. In general, inclusive membership, mutipurposity, decision-making by consensus, and a deliberative mandate are more conducive to socialisation, as they facilitate persuasion. In terms of ideology, ideological flexibility, rather than substance, is more conducive to socialisation. In Asian institutions, the link between socialisation and institution-design has been a two-way process. Prior norms developed through interactions and informal institutions (Bandung Conference, 1955, Association of Southeast Asia) have influenced the design of formal institutions (ASEAN). At the same time, institutions have rendered these designs stable if not permanent. The ASEAN Way thus became the basis for the 'Asia-Pacific Way', or Asia Pacific institutions like the ARF, APEC, and the East Asian community blueprint. The element of path dependency in the design of Asia regional institutions is especially striking.

It is clear that decision-making rule and mandate have been crucial to the socialising potential of Asian institutions, including ASEAN, APEC, and ARF. All operate by consensus, and have a deliberative, rather than distributive mandate. The effect of scope and membership is less clear. ASEAN expansion has been important to its continued relevance in the post-Cold War era, while the ARF's principle of inclusiveness is what has sustained it so far and resulted in the engagement of China and US. But it's unclear whether APEC's expansion to the Latin American nations has been as fruitful, as it raises the question not only of dilution of regional identity, but also the lower frequency and intensity of contact which are crucial to socialisation. Ideological flexibility has been common to all Asian groups, which have accommodated different degrees of openness to market economics, political democracy and state sovereignty. There is no NATO type or EU style ideology binding Asian institutions. And despite growing legalization (Kahler

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[1] I am grateful to a reviewer for the ADB for suggesting this variable, and the quote is from the review.

2004) and formalization (e.g. ASEAN Charter), there is no prospect of major and sudden changes to this situation.

Conclusion

Constructivists still account for only a small, if growing, number of scholars working on Asia's international relations and regionalism; other perspectives, especially realist perspectives are plentiful and influential. (Constructivists do, however, seem to outnumber institutionalist and certainly domestic politics approaches to Asian regionalism). Moreover, as noted, constructivist writings do not constitute a homogeneous category. "While all take ideational factors and socialisation seriously, they differ on the degree of transformation to the existing regional order that they argue is possible. Indeed, constructivists are not uniformly optimistic about [Asia's] regional order; aspects of their critical perspective on aspects of regional order borders on realism." (Acharya and Stubbs 2006)

Despite these differences, the constructivist turns in international relations theory has influenced and advanced the study of Asian regionalism and regional institutions in important ways. It broadens the understanding of the sources and determinants of Asian regional institutions by giving due play to the role of ideational forces, such as culture, norms and identity, as opposed to material determinants. Relatedly, by stressing the role of culture and identity, it has helped to link the insights of the traditional area studies approach to Asia or Asian states to the larger domain of international relations theory. Constructivism has also introduced a less static conception of Asia's regional order. By giving greater play to the possibility of peaceful change through socialisation, constructivism has challenged the hitherto centrality of the balance of power perspective. At the very least, it has infused greater theoretical diversity and opened the space for debate, thereby moving the study of Asia's regional relations significantly beyond the traditionally dominant realist perspective.

Conversely, constructivist writings on Asian regional institutions have contributed to constructivist international relations theory. Like other major theories of IR, constructivism emerged and initially reflected predominantly Western intellectual concerns and debates. But it has found a solid foothold in Asia. Constructivist writings on Asian regionalism have made some distinctive contributions, as highlighted in this essay. One contribution is that ideas and norms that are borrowed from outside go through a localization process, rather than adopted wholesale, before they trigger institutional change. This is seen in the ideas of open regionalism and cooperative security in APEC and ARF respectively. Second, institutions can emerge and achieve success despite great power indifference or opposition. A corollary is that institutions created and led by weaker actors can engage and socialize stronger states (ASEAN and ARF in relation to the US and China). Third, institutions need not be formal or legalistic in order to play a meaningful role in redefining actor interests and identities (ASEAN Way). Finally, the effects of socialization through international institutions need not be confined to a Type I (tentative and transitional) or a Type II (taken for granted and transformative) outcome, but a Type III outcome in which actors continue to be motivated by both a logic of consequences and a logic of appropriateness on a long-term basis. These insights are not just applicable to the Asian context, but have a wider relevance to the study of regional and international institutions in general.

But the work is far from complete. Socialisation as a tool of analysing Asian regionalism is new and relatively untested. But as Asian institutions proliferate and age, Asia like Europe will provide a vibrant arena for testing socialisation theory. In the meantime, constructivism's potential to contribute to a thorough understanding of Asian regional institutions remains unfulfilled. Much more empirical research needs to be done before one can get answers to some of the basic questions posed by constructivists regarding the socialising effects of Asian institutions. For example, it would require investigations (through analysis of official records, interviews and surveys and content analysis) into the presence of different mechanisms of socialisation including strategic calculation, role playing and micro-processes of mimicking, persuasion, norm localization, and social influence. This would need to be accompanied by compiling and analysing indicators of the three types of internalisation and differences in the behavior of new member states of Asian institutions before and after socialisation. The work has just begun.

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